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IN

TH~

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JEANNETTE U. SWAN,.
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
Case No. 14823
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB and
DR. DENNIS D. THOEN,
Defendants and
Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice case brought by

by the plaintiff JEANNETTE U. SWAN against defendants
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB,

a specialist in the field of

orthopedic surgery, and DR. DENNIS D. THOEN, a
specialist in the field of neurology, for injuries
in the form of permanent partial. paraplegia, which
she allegedly suffered as a result of certain
diagnostic and surgical procedures improperly performed upon her spine and spinal canal by the said
defendants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was brought, inter alia, on theories
of negligence and lack of inform~d consent, and was
tried before a jury.

At trial the court refused to

I

i
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allow plaintiff's expert witness to testify concerning the standard of medical care which governed
defendant's conduct.

Having so ruled, the court,

at the close of plaintiff's evidence, granted
defendants' motion to dismiss as to the negligence
theory for failure to establish a prima facie case.
The case went to the jury with instructions on the
theory of lack of informed consent only, and the
jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants,
no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the decision in
the lower court and the grant of a new trial on
grounds that the trial judge erred in stating and
applying the law in Utah with respect to (1) the
standard of care required of doctors who are alleged
to have committed medical malpractice, and (2) the
qualifications required of an expert witness in
order that he be permitted to testify as to the said
standard of care.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 12, 1972, the plaintiff, Mrs.
Jeannette U. Swan, age 68, was admitted by her private physician to the St. Mark's Hospital in Salt
.
.
. and eva 1 ua t ion
·
of persistent
Lake City
for diagnosis

-2-
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pains that she had been experiencing in her lower
back and right leg.

Transcript, day 1 at 33-34.

At

the time of her admission, Mrs. Swan was ambulatory
and, though she found it painful at times to do so,
was able to walk and move about the hospital with
some facility.

Tr. day 4 at 72.

The first days of her hospitalization consisted
of a variety of tests and examinations.

On Septem-

ber 13th, her motor and nerve responses were found
to be essentially normal

(Tr. day 2 at 5) but other

tests led her doctors to believe that she might have
a high degree of block in her spinal canal.
2 at 13; 3 at 21.

Tr. day

On the fifth day of her hospital

stay, September 16, 1972, a myelogram was performed
upon Mrs. Swan by the defendant Dr. Dennis D. Thoen,
a neurologist.

Tr. day 3 at 18.

In this procedure,

a quantity of spinal fluid was removed from the
terminal portion of the spinal canal and replaced by
injection of 10 cc of a radiographic contrast medium
called pantopaque.

Tr. day 3 at 20, 26-27.

Mrs.

Swan was then titled into various positions so that
the flow of pantopaque could be observed under flouroscopy and indicate the presence or absence of defects,
obstructions or other abnormalities in the area of
the spinal canal.

Tr. day 2 at 15; 3 at 18, 48, 69.

-3-
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In the course of performing the myelogram, Dr.
Thoen did not record the opening or closing spinal
fluid pressures.

Tr. day 3 at 24, 30.

Neither did

he record the quantity of spinal fluid removed prior
to the injection of the pantopaque radiographic dye.
Tr. day 3 at 27.

At the conclusion of the myelograrn,

Dr. Theon did not remove the pantopaque.
3 at 32.

Tr. day

During the actual myelographic procedure,

Mrs. Swan complained of very severe pain.
at 71.

Tr. day 4

Following the myelogram, the intense pain

persisted and was accompanied by general weakness in
her legs.

Tr. day 3 at 41.

Although Dr. Thoen stated

that he conducted a neurological examination upon
Mrs. Swan in an attempt to determine the cause of
her pain and weakness, she was neither x-rayed nor
flouroscoped in the ensuing days.

Tr. day 3 at 42,

48-49.
Results of the myelogram showed defects consisting of narrowing or blocks at the L-1, L-2 and L-3
lumbar vertebral levels.

Tr. day 2 at 15.

recommended surgery to correct the defects.

Dr. Thoen
Tr. day

3 at 46.
On September 18, 1972, defendant Dr. Robert H.
Lamb performed a lumbar

decompression laminectomy

upon Mrs. Swan's spine.

Tr. day~2 at 21, 22, 2 9 .

said procedure, performed in the face of changing
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neurological signs (Tr. day 2 at 112) and without
the benefit of a current neurological examination
(Tr. day 3 at 46-47), involved the surgical removal
of portions of bone in the lumbar area in an effort
to cure the narrowing at the spinal canal.
2 at 97.

Tr. day

None of the bone removed was ever sent

to the pathology lab.

Tr. day 2 at 41.

In what was

the seventh of eight separate operations performed
by Dr. Lamb that same day

(Tr. day 2 at 45), he

operated from the L-2 level down to L-4, but did not
operate at the site of the defect indicated at L-1;
neither did he use a cather to determine whether
the spinal canal was clear at L-1.
112-113; Tr. day 2 at 15, 16.

Tr. day 2 at 32,

Mrs. Swan testified

that prior to the operation Dr. Lamb assured her
that she would be out of the hospital in about ten
days.

Tr. 4 at 73.

She also testified that he told

her she would be better if she had an operation.

Tr.

day 4 at 74.
When Mrs. Swan awoke the morning following
surgery, she could not move her legs.
75.

Tr. day 4 at

An examination by Dr. Thoen on September 20,

1972, revealed that she was not able to move anything
below her knees.

Tr. day 3 at 47.

On October 9, 1972,

Dr. Al Martin performed a decompression laminectomy

Ii
l

at the L-1 level of Mrs. Swan's spine.

Tr. day 2
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l
at 25, 106.

This second operation failed to restore

any significant capacity in the use of her lower
extremities and on November 7, 1972, Mrs. Swan was
discharged to the Bonneville Nursing Home as a paraplegic.

Tr. day 1 at 35, 39, 44.

At the time of the trial of this case, Mrs.
Swan was medically found to be suffering from paraplegia.

In connection with that condition, she has

lost control of her bowel and bladder function,
experienced atrophy of her left lower extremity and
paralysis of all nerve roots below the L-3, L-4 level,
and has lost feeling in her right foot, left leg and
about the saddle peritoneal areas.
28.

Tr. day 4 at 27,

She must wear a leg brace and use a wheelchair

or walker to get from place to place in her apartment.
Tr. day 1 at 43.

She is required to take large doses

of narcotic medications for pain.
At the trial of her· case, the

Tr. day 1 at 44 ·
plaint~iff,

Mrs.

Swan, offered the expert testimony of a neurosurgeon
from Los Angeles, Dr. Peter M. Rocovich, on the issue
of the standard of care required of physicians and
surgeons performing myelograms and lumbar decompression
laminectomies on persons like plaintiff at the time
when the said procedures were performed upon her.
Included among Dr. Rocovich's credentials that were
presented to the court as foundation for such
-6-
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testi•'"YJ

were the following:
The doctor received his M.D. degree from St.
Louis University School of Medicine in 1942, after
which he interned at Huntington Memorial Hospital
in Pasadena, California.

For three years, from 1943-

1946, he was a general surgeon in the U.S. Army in the
European theatre.

Following his military service he

fulfilled his residency requirements in neurosurgery
at White Memorial Hospital which was associated
with the Loma Linda Medical College.

In 1948-1949

he served as instructor of resident neurological
surgery at Albany Medical College in New York.

In

that assignment, he was charged with instructing and
training in the fields of neurology and neurosurgery.
In 1949, the doctor returned to California and started
private practice where he has continued to the present.
For 25 years Dr. Rocovich has headed a neurological
and neurosurgical clinic at the Orthopedic Hospital
of Los Angeles.

The Orthopedic Hospital affiliates

with the University of Southern California Medical
School and is involved in teaching and training resident physicians from all 9ver the United States.

Dr.

Rocovich was also the head of the Department of
Neurosurgery at the Queen of Angels Hospital in
Los Angeles for 12 years and served for a time on
the faculty school of nursing.

During such time,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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said hospital had a complete training program for
interns and residents as well as a medical school
affiliation.

Dr. Rocovich is a member of numerous

medical societies, both national and regional,
including the American Medical College, Western
States Federation of Neurological Sciences,

Californ~

Medical Association, Southern California Neurosurgkal
Society, and Los Angeles County Medical Association.
Tr. day 3 at 100-105.
In addition to the above mentioned credentials,

Dr. Rocovich testified that, over the course of his
professional career he personally had performed over
a thousand lumbar decompression laminectomies and
over a thousand myelograms of the types that were
performed upon Mrs. Swan.

Tr. day 3 at 109.

Dr.

Rocovich was asked whether he was acquainted with
standards of skill and care for neurosurgeons
practicing in any states outside of California.

His affirmative response was followed by the
following explanation:
From my educaticn background, from_ the
individual education background, from being
a graduate of a graqe A medical school, from
being trained in various parts of the co~ntry
at different times, from being accepted into
the Army and with other men, other doctors
from all over the states of the union and
all on the same equal level- in the Army,
from my practice in--well, in the large
communities where you have medical schools
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and where you have hospitals, where
you have training programs, and you have
communications and you have books,
you have publications, you have the
competition of one area against the
other.
This establishes the practice
throughout the whole country and it's
on the same level.
Tr. day 3 at 107.
When Dr. Rocovich was asked if he had an opinion
as to whether or not there was a different standard
of care for various types of doctors who operate to
enter the spinal canal objections by defendants
were sustained for lack of proper foundation.
day 3 at 109,110.

Tr.

Plaintiff offered to prove that

the standard of care for all doctors entering the
spinal canal area was the same.

Tr. day 3 at 119.

Plaintiff further offered to prove that myelograrn
and decompression laminectomy procedures of the
types to which she had been subjected were routinely
performed by persons in defendants' fields and, as
such, were standardized in much the same way as the
treatment of a broken arm.

Tr. day 3 at 120.

After considering the issue of what standard
of medical care to apply, the court rejected plaintiff's
arguments for application of a similar community
standard,

(Tr. day 3 at 111), as well as a standard

of the medical profession,

(Tr. day 3 at 114), and

ruled that Utah law required a doctor to exercise
only that degree of skill and care required of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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average competent medical practitioner in

defendan~'

same locality, Tr. day 3 at 111; furthermore, that in ordE:
to be qualified to testify on said standard of care in
such a locality, a witness had to demonstrate "personal contact or experience within the State of
Utah."
7.

Tr. day 3 at 118.

See also Tr. day 4 at 6,

The trial judge ruled that since Dr. Rocovich

had not practiced in Utah he could not testify as
to the standard of care required of a doctor
practicing in Utah.
Had Dr. Rocovich been permitted to, he would
have testified that the conduct of both defendants
violated" the standards of care for the performance
of myelograms and lumbar decompression laminectomies
in Salt Lake City and areas similar to Salt Lake City
during the period of September, 1972, as follows:
Dr. Thoen failed to perform and record a complete neurological examination prior to the first
surgery.

He left the pantopaque in the spinal canal.

He failed to repeat the myelogram before surgery
despite the presence of partial paralysis.

He

failed to record neurological findings and changes
which he claims to have observed.

He failed to pro-

perly record findings with respect to the myelogram
procedure.

Tr. day 4 at

106-107~

Dr. Lamb operated without a complete and current
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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neurological examination in the face of changing
neurological signs following the myelogram and prior
to surgery.

He failed to submit surgical specimens

to the pathology lab for evaluation.

He failed to

decompress the lamina at L-1 during the surgery he
performed.

He failed to use a catheter to determine

whether the spinal canal was clear at the L-1 level
at the time of surgery.

He traumatized the nerve

roots at L-3, L-4 during surgery.

Tr. day 4 at 106.

Despite the court's preclusion of his opinion concerning the standard of care, plaintiff's expert
was deemed qualified to express an opinion with
probable medical certainty as to what caused
plaintiff's injuries.

He stated that Mrs. Swan's

paraplegia was due to trauma which occurred principally at the time of surgery.

Tr. day 4 at 44.

As

described by Dr. Rocovich, the irritation to the nerve
roots caused by non-removal of the pantopaque caused
them to be inflamed or injured.

Said injury was

compounded when the nerve roots were traumatized
upon surgical removal of the posterior arch, thus
producing immediate paralysis.

Tr. day 4 at 46-47.

Plaintiff's evidence of causation, stripped of
the benefit of her expert's testimony as to the
standard of care, was deemed insufficient to survive
defendant's motion to dismiss as to the negligence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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count of her complaint.

Tr. day

5

at 6.

Thus, Mrs.

Swan

was prevented from reaching a jury with that portion
of her claim.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT, A CALIFORNIA NEUROSURGEON,
TO TESTIFY ON THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED
OF THE DEFENDANT DOCTORS.
In order to maintain an action for medical rnalpractice, a plaintiff-patient must prove that the
defendant-physician's conduct failed to meet the
particular standard of care and skill that the jurisdiction in question requires of all physicians and
surgeons encJaged in the same type of practice as the
defendant, and that said failure was the cause of
the injury claimed to have been suffered.

w. Prosser,

Handbook of the Law of Torts 161-166 (4th ed. 1971).
In order to establish the standard, since knowledge
of such things is not possessed by laymen, the
plaintiff must, generally speaking, produce testimony
from a medical expert who can explain said standard
as defined in that jurisdiction, and can also state
whether any breach thereof caused the harm complained
523
of. See Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d
216
(1957); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 130 P.2d
(1943).

-12-
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History shows that the courts of the United
states have used four basic approaches in establishing
the standard of care to be required of physicians
and surgeons.

They have variously required that

such practitioners exercise the skill and care of
physicians in good standing in (1) the defendant's
same locality (strict localj ty rule);

(2) the

defendant's same general neighborhood (same general
neighborhood rule);

(3) localj ties similar to

defendant's (similar locality rule); or (4) the
medical profession (national standard rule).

Annot.,

37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971); D. Louisell & H. Williams,
Medical Malpractice,

~[8.

06

1

(197 3) .

In ruling tbat Dr. Rocovich did not qualify to
testify as to the standard of care required of the
defendant physicians in this case, the trial judge
stated that decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
mandated his application of the standard as practiced
by doctors "in this locality," thus applying a form
of the strict locality rule.

Tr. day 3 at 111.

The

suggestion that Utah Law held doctors to the standard
of care of physicians in good standing in the same
or similar locality was specifically rejected.
day 3 at 111.

Tr.

Plaintiff's arguments that changed

practices and circumstances dictated the adoption of
a national standard of care, especially in cases
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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involving defendants holding themselves out as
specialists, were also rejected.

Tr. day 3 at 114;

4 at 10.
It is true that, at first reading, some of the
cases in which this court has referred to the medical
standard of care could lead the reader to conclude
thatastrict locality test is required.

However,

a closer analysis of the decisions containing references to the subject shows that, in fact, the
language of a variety of different tests appears:
Two cases describe the standard of care to be
the exercise of that degree of skill and care required
of an ordinarily skilled doctor t
which he serves."

II

in the COffiffiUnity

Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262,

266, 139 P.2d 216, 218

(1943); Fredrickson v. Maw,

119 Utah 385, 387, 227 P.2d 772, 773 (1951).

This

language clearly reflects the strict locality rule.
At least six cases say that a doctor must
exercise that degree of skill and care practiced by
skilled professionals doing "the same type of work
in the vicinity" or "in the same area.

11

Baxter v. S~ 1

78 Utah 217, 232, 2 P.2d 257, 263 (1931); Edwards v.
Clark, 96 Utah 121, 138, -83 P.2d 1021, 1029-30 (1938),
rehrg den., 96 Utah 140, 84 P.2d 768

(1938); ~rre~

v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 612, 26l_P.2d 178, 179 (195 3);
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 44, 347 P.2d UOS,
1110 (1959); Paull v. Zions First National Bank,
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18 Utah 2d 183, 185, 417 P.2d 759, 761 (1966);
Posnien v. Rogers, 533 P.2d 120, 121

(Utah 1975).

This language, only slightly broader than the strict
locality rule, seems to state the same general
neighborhood rule.
Two cases contain language which describes the
standard to be that required of "men of similar
calling under similar circumstances," Dickinson v.
Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 386, 423 P.2d 663, 665 (1967);
or "in the same or a similar locality."

Baker v.

Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 212, 79 P.2d 77, 84

(1938).

This

language further broadens the test to include the
standards of similar localities.
The only case to address the question of whether
a national standard should be applied in Utah was Coon

v. Shields, 88 Utah 75, 39 P.2d 348 (1934).

At

the time, the Court did not feel the medical profession was ready for the broader standard, but predicted the day of its eventual adoption.

~· at

82, 39 P.2d at 350. See also Point V, infra at 47.
Recently in Ficklin v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295
(Utah 1976), the Court spoke of the standard of care
as being that which is "extant in medical circles."
Ficklin, at 1297.

Such language may reflect current

judicial approaches to make the standard fit changed
medical circumstances, in accordance with earlier predictions.
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In order to account for the apparent lack of
stati~

uniformity in language used by this Court in

the medical standard of care, one need only consult
the factual settings of the aforementioned cases.
In no instance is the statement of the rule a
critical element of the decision rendered in the case.
Since no decision ever turned on which test was to
be applied, it is natural that some imprecision could
result.
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257

(1931);

and Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d l108
(1959) involved situations where the plaintiffs failed
to offer expert testimony on the medical standard of
care.

Since expert testimony is generally required

to establish medical standards of care, and since
no experts testified on any of the possible applicable
standards, it was immaterial which standard the court
applied.

Plaintiffs would have lost in any event.

Thus, the Court's statements that defendants were
held to a "same vicinity" rule were dicta and not
holdings.
Additional explanation of the lack of consistency
in the language on the medical standard of care to
be applied appears in the cases where plaintiff's own
witness, called to establish the standard of care,
testified that defendants complied with it.

-16-

such
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was the case in Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83
P.2d 1021 (1938); and Posnien v. Rogers, 553 P.2d
120 (Utah 1975).

Since plaintiffs' own witnesses

established the standard of care, the correctness
of that standard obviously was not at issue in their
respective appeals.

The court's inclusion of "same

vicinity" language in Edwards, and "same area"
language in Posnien was not a part of the holding
of either case.
In two of the cases, the competency of the
plaintiffs' experts to testify on the applicable
standard of care apparently was not challenged at
trial, and thus did not come into question on
appeal.

In both Baker v. Wycoff, 95 Utah 199,

79 P.2d, 77

(1938), where the court spoke of a

"similar locality" test, and Forrest v. Eason,
123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953), where· the court
described· a "same vicinity" test, the expert witness
testimony offered by plaintiffs on the standard of
care was allowed at the trial level.

In Baker,

where the plaintiff prevailed, the defendant did not
challenge the correctness of the standard as applied
and is was not treated as an issue in the case on
appeal.

In Forrest, where the defendant prevailed,

the correctness of the standard of care as established

I

by

Plaintiff's own witness was obviously not addressed
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on appeal.

The tests announced in both cases were,

therefore, unnecessary to the holdings of the cases,
and, as stated, served only an illustrative role
in the written decisions.
In still another group of cases, the facts
were such that either the standard of care and the
breach thereof were stated to be adequately established
by the evidence, or, for the purposes of the appeal,
were assumed to have been established.

Whether the

correct standard was applied or not was irrelevant
to the outcome of the case since it obviously was
decided on other grounds.

In Paull v. Zions First

National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966);
Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 663 (1967);
and Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 388, 423 P.2d 663 11961),
the court assumed a breach of the standard of care,
• but said that said breach was not proven to be the
proximate cause of plaintiff's disability.

Whichever

standard was applied was therefore not outcome
determinative and cannot be relied upon as the rule
of the case:.
Similar logic applies in the analysis of
Fredrickon v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951)
wherein the court held that defendant's conduct was
violative of the strict locality rule as a matter of
common knowledge.

(Defendant sutured a surgical

sponge in the wound created by a tonsillectomy.)
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J

Obviously if defendant's conduct violated this
narrowest of standards, it would also have violated
any one of the broader standards.

The standard

announced by the court here, as in the cases cited
above, was not part of the holding of the case.
It is interesting to note that in Coon v. Shields,
88 Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348

(1934), probably the only

case in which the court was directly presented
with the opportunity to decide whether to apply the
strict locality rule, or the similar locality rule, it
chose to adopt neither, stating as its reason the following:
[W]hether we adopt the rule of limitation to
a particular community or a rule of limitation
to similar communities, it would not affect
this case . . • . Coon, at 83, 39 P.2d at 351.
When the trial court in the instant case applied
a form of the strict locality rule on the presumption
that such a position was mandated by the decisions
of the Supreme Court, it committed an error which
prejudiced the rights of the plaintiff Jeannette U.
Swan.

As has been shown, although this Court has

included in its opinions several statements relating
to the standard of care applicable in medical malpractice cases, it has never, by way of holding,
adopted any one of the four basic standards to
which it has at various times referred.

In this

serise, the issues arising in the instant appeal
-19-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

present a case of first impression to the Court.
Those issues are:

( 1)

What standard of care should

be applied to the medical profession in Utah?. and
(2) Whether an otherwise qualified expert who
lacks only personal experience and contact with
Utah Physicians should be precludeQ from testifying
on the said standard of care.
POINT I I
THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE IS AN ANACHRONISM
WHICH HAS OUTLIVED ITS PURPOSE AND USEFULNESS
IN EVEN THE VERY FEW JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH
ITS OPPRESSIVE EFFECTS ARE STILL FELT.
As described above, the strict locality rule
states basically that a medical practitioner has the
obligation to his patient to possess and employ only
such reasonable skill and care as is conunonly had
and exercised by other medical practioners in the
particular locality or conununi ty in which he practices.
Annot. 37 A.L.R.3d 420, 426 (1971); 40 Fordham L.
Rev. 435, 438 (1971).

This particular rule was

developed late in the 1800s for the purpose of protecting the rural and small town practitioner who
was presumed (perhaps with good reason), to be less
adequately trained and informed than his big city
brother.

waitz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the

Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation,
DePaul L. Rev. 408, 410 (1969).

One court, quoting
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18

from an early author, supplied the following explanation for the adoption of such a standard:
There are many neighborhoods, in the west
especially, where medical aid is of difficult attainment.
Yet cases of disease and
surgery are constantly occurring, and they
must of necessity fall into the hands of
those who have given the subject but little
if any thought. * * * In such cases no more
can be expected of the operator than the
exercise of his best skill and judgment.
Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46, 63 (1870).
Under the conditions of geographic isolation
that prevailed in the frontier days, when distances
were great and the mode of travel was in keeping with
muddy lanes, swollen streams and impassable mountains,
it was natural for the standards of practice between
locality to be markedly different.

Opportunities

for observation, experience and consultation were
strictly limited; and the fact that news of medical
developments appeared only in the pages of the. few
scattered medical journals or in an occasional
handwritten letter made it logical that the village
doctor, making his rounds to the homes of his
patients and fighting to provide them with what
care and attention he could, would be judged by a
different standard.

Comment, 16 St. Louis U.L.J.

497, 505 (1972); Ellin, The Law of Medical Malpractice
in Maryland:

A Plaintiff's Dilemma, 3 Balt. L. Rev.

207, 212 (1974); 14 Stan L. Rev. 884, 886 (1962).
-21-
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The conditions under which such doctors

labor~

made it impossible for them to be attuned to the
developments in their profession and the practices
of their colleagues.

One author provides the

following insights into those early days:
The general practitioner "who rode
west . . . slept on the ground when he
could to avoid flea-infested cabins and
inns, where a dozen men were customarily
lodged in a room with three or four in
each bed.
He crunched through winter
forests on snowshoes, forded swollen rivers
on his horse in the spring, and rode
sweating down the hot trails of summer. Often
the only drugstore in hundreds of miles was
in his saddlebag. He pounded his own drugs,
made tinctures and infusions, and put up
prescriptions with the aid of horn balances
and a china mortar." G. Marks & w. Beatty,
The Story of Medicine in America 144 (1973).
Despite possible historical and circumstantial
justifications for the formulation of the strict
locality rule, it is interesting to note that it was
never adopted in England (Waltz, 18 DePaul L. Rev.,
~at

410), and was only adopted in a small

minority of American jurisdictions.

41 Arn.Jur.

Physicians and Surgeons §87

The reason for

(1942).

this becomes apparent as one begins to examine and
evaluate some of its drawbacks.
One problem that is encountered upon application
of the strict locality rule is its tendency to make
possible the creation of an insulated pocket of
incompetent medical practice in a given locality.
-22-
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Because the rule, as formulated, allowed application
only of the standard extant in a defendant's
corrununity, it literally demanded that a medical
expert testifying for the plaintiff be personally
familiar with the practice there.
~.,

supra at 410.

Waltz, 18 DePaul

If plaintiff's expert did

not come form defendant's home town, he arguably did
not have the proper experience to testify against
the defendant.
The effective result of the strict locality rule
was to immunize from malpractice liability .any doctorwho happened to be the sole practitioner in his
community.

As stated by one author, under a technical

application of such a rule, a doctor could get away
with "treating bone fractures by the application of
wet grape leaves and yet remain beyond the criticism
of more

enlightened practitioners from other

communities."

Id. at 411.

Similarly a group of

incompetents could set up practice in a community
and, by uniformly practicing a substandard form of
medicine, insulate themselves from any form of
malpractice liability.
Another problem that is encountered in applying
the strict locality rule sterns from the natural
reluctance of physicians who work together and whose
paths cross, to testify against one another.

It is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

true that the American Medical Association, interpreting its Principles of Medical Ethics, states
that a "physician should expose, without fear or
favor, incompetent or corrupt, dishonest or unethical
conduct on the part of members of the profession .
American Medical Association, Opinions and Reports
of the Judicial Council 15 (1966).

However, the

difficulties experienced by plaintiffs in finding
doctors willing to testify in their behalf have been
recognized by courts, legislatures, and commentators
alike.
P.2d 829

Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438
(1968); Steiginga v. Thran, 30 N.J. Super.

423, 105 A.2d 10 (App.Div. 1954); Salgo v. Leland
Stanford University, 154Cal.App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.2d 73, 431
P.2d 973

(1967); Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425,

94 N.W. 607

(1903); Mass. Ann. Laws. ch. 233, §79C

(1974); Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied:

The

Silent Medical Treatment, 1 Vill. L. Rev. 250 (1956);
Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. ReY.;_
520 (1965).
Even in cases where the physician's wrongdoing

is most egregious there -is a decided unwillingness of
doctors to take the stand for the plaintiff-patient.
Dean William Prosser cites a su£vey made by the
Boston University Law-Medicine Research Institute,
as reported in Medical Economics, August 28, 19
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•

in which the reality of physician reluctance to
testify is most forcefully illustrated.
[O]ut of 214 doctors, only 31% of the
specialists and 27% of the general practitioners said they would be willing to
appear for the plaintiff if a surgeon,
operating on a diseased kidney, removed
the wrong one. W. Prosser, Handbook of
the Law of Torts 227, n.3 (4th Ed. 1971).
Though such a reluctance on the part of doctors
to take the stand on behalf of a victim of malpractice may seem improper, it is not difficult to
understand.

Many doctors naturally hesitate to

injure friends and fellow-craftsmen.

Some fear

the foreign atmosphere of the: courtroom and the
rigors of undergoing cross-examination.

Still

others are reluctant to suffer the loss of time
and income frc.m practice that may be involved in
a courtroom appearance.

U.S. Department of Health,

Education, and Welfare, Report of the Secretary's
Commission on Medical Malpractice 36-37 (1973).

One

case reported that an insurance company cancelled
the professional liability policy of a doctor who
had the temerity to testify against a fellow
practitioner being sued for malpractice.
defendant was insured by the same company.

The
L'Orange

v. Medical Protective co. 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968).
Though this case is not r.ecessarily indicative of
the actions of aJl malpractice insurers, it cannot
be gainsaid that many pressures are exerted on the
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physician to discourage his cooperation with
plaintiffs in malpractice cases.

It would be un-

realistic to suppose that a plaintiff would be
able to produce the necessary expert witnesses to
establish his case under a strict locality rule.
Defendants, on the other hand are able to
obtain whatever local experts they may need at the
trial of a malpractice case.

Evidence of this

fact is found in the recent case of Capobianco v.
Gordon, 19 Md.App. 662, 313 A.2d 517

(1974).

There

the gratuitous services of a panel of experts from
a Medical-Chirurgical Faculty were offered to a
defendant physician to help in the defense of his
case.

A letter written to the defendant by counsel

for the Med-Chi Faculty contained the following:
Dear Dr. Gordon:
I confirm the referral by Med-Chi to
this office of your defense pursuant to its
By Laws.
I should appreciate your insurance
carrier and its counsel advising me of such
time, if any, as it would consider a panel
of doctors to be of assistance in this matter.
In the meantime, you are cautioned to
restrict communication on the subject to
authorized representatives of your carrier, its
counsel and this office.
Very truly yours,
/s/ John F. King
JOHN F. KING
Capobianco, at 664, 313 A.2d at 518.

(Emphasis added.)
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The foreclosure to plaintiff of all opportunity
to meet such determined opposition by disallowing
the production of an expert from a more disinterested
medical area is inimical to the cause of justice.
Probably the biggest problem with the strict
locality rule is that it is blind to the realities
of modern medical science.

While it may have served

a valid purpose in frontier times, it has no place
in jurisprudence today.

As observed by one court:

[T)imes have changed. Modern means of
transportation permit country doctors to
attend up-to-date medical seminars; the
general circulation of medical journals
makes new developments readily available
to them, and they can easily and quickly
communicate with the most modern and upto-date medical centers in cities throughout
the United States * * * [T]oday's rural
practitioner can and does give and receive
advice transmitted thousands of miles over
the telephone, and he is expected to keep
himself apprised of recent developments as
they are regularly published in medical
journals. Douglas v. Bussabarger 73 Wash.2d
476, 438 p.2d 829, 837 (1968).
No longer does the medical community consist of
a patchwork of isolated practitioners whose particular
brand of medicine requires legal protection from
comparison to the standards adhered to in other
areas of the United States.

"Surely there could

be found today few physicians who would defend the
notion that their brothers in some parts of the
country are, or should be pe~mitted ~Q be, Jess
-27-
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competent than those in other regions, based not
on impermissibly variant education and training
but on some inexplicable depressing force of
geography alone."
supra at 420.

Waltz, 18 DePaul L. Rev.,

The courts have recognized the

realities of today's medical environment and have
considered the inequities produced by the strict
locality rule and, with few exceptions, have abandoned
it.

Thus, they have acknowledged that "the legal

rule ceases when the reasons for it cease."

D.

Louisell and H. Williams, 1 Medical Malpractice
(See Point V, infra at

,[8.06 (1973).

42, for

a discussion of the nationally uniform standards of
medical practice.}
In the present case the trial judge quoted from
a Nevada case, Lockart v. MacLean, 77 Nev. 210, 361
P.2d 670 (1961), to support his decision to reject
testimony by Dr. Rocovich on the standard of care
to be applied.

Tr. day 4 at 7.

The circumstances

of that case make is inapposite to the matters at
issue here.

Lockart involved a malpractice suit

brought against a Reno doctor and hospital by a
plaintiff who developed a bone infection subsequent
to surgery.

In his complaint plaintiff alleged that

defendants "'did not exercise the degree of care'
.
.
.
skill and learning
ordinarily
possessed by hospitals

-28-
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and physicians and surgeons practicing in the same
locality.'"

Lockart, at 671.

(Emphasis added.)

As his expert witness, plaintiff offered an
osteopath from California who based his testimony on
"his knowledge of the standard of conduct of surgeons
and orthopedic surgeons practicing throughout the
united States."

Lockart, at 673.

The expert was

held to be incompetent to testify.
As can be seen, the trial court in Lockart was
forced by the pleadings to apply the strict locality
rule.

Plaintiff in effect elected the standard by

which his expert's competence was to be judged.
Under that standard his expert failed to qualify.
The present case contains no such procedural
justification for the preservation of the jurisprudential relic known as the strict locality rule.
POINT III
THE SAME GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD RULE IS A
RESTATEMENT OF THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE
CONTAINING THE SAME DEFECTS AND CREATING
THE SAME PROBLEMS AS ITS PREDECESSOR.
In recognition of the near insuperable handicap
which had been imposed on the victims of malpractice who,
under the strict locality rule, were required to produce
local expert witnesses where none were to be found, the
courts in many jurisdictions attempted to modify the
rule.

One such modification was the formulation of
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I

I
the "same general neighborhood" rule which, by
holdj_ng a doctor to practice medicine in accordance

I

with the standards of physicians in good standing in
his same general area, allowed a malpractice plaintiff

I

to produce experts that were not from the defendant's
hometown, though they were from places nearby.

Thus,

in Willard v. Norcross, 86 Vt. 426, 85 A. 904 (1913),
plaintiff was allowed to introduce expert testimony
of doctors that practiced 40 miles away from the town
where the defendant practiced. Also in Geraty v.
Kaufman,

115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932), plaintiff's

exp_ert from Bridgport, Connecticut, was allowed to testify
on the standard of care in defendant's hometown of New
London, Connecticut.
With the transportion and communication advances
of later years, some courts, applying the same general
neighborhood rule, expanded the boundaries of the
"neighborhood" slightly to include larger land areas.
See_ Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1970).
However, by preserving the geographical

insularity of

a particular area, the same general neighborhood rule
perpetuates many of the same problems as existed under
the strict locality rule.

In effect, it is merely a

new name for the strict locality rule, the only difference
being a moderate enlargement of the locality.
rule which
Implicit in a court's adoption Of any
-30-
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requires conformance to standards of care of only a
given geographical neighborhood is the idea that the
standards of care in that area should be permitted to
be different from other areas. Also implicit in the
establishment of a geographical neighborhood is the
idea that the standards within that neighborhood are
or should be uniform.

Thus, if the State of Utah were

to be set apart as being a "general neighborhood" it
would be on the implicit assumption that the standards
of care for physicians in the state were uniform, but
that those standards, as

compared with physicians of

other states, were different, i.e. higher or lower.
If the standards of care in other states were lower
than in Utah, a rule precluding the testimony of outof-state experts on the standards familiar
be unnecessary.

to them would

Utah doctors would be practicing at a

higher level. If the standards of care in other states
were higher than Utah's the courts, by excluding expert
testimony from out-of-state witnesses, would foster
and perpetuate medical inferiority on a statewide basis.
This court cannot, without believing that Utah standards
are justifiably lower than those of other states, countenance the appli.cation of a same general neighborhood rule
in such a way as to affirm the lower court's decision to
reject testimony from Dr. Rocovich.
The same general neighborhood rule likewise fails
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to cure the problems created by physician reluctaoce
to testify for a plaintiff in a malpractice case.
The mobility enjoyed by today's doctor has resulted
in his knowing or being known by a large number of his
fellow practitioners from all over the state.

Close

collegial relationships develop as doctors attend the
same seminars, conferences and symposia, belong to
the same organizations, refer patients to each other
and rely on each other for consultation and advice.
The climate that develops operates to discourage a
doctor from testifying against someone he has met or might
meet.

The vitality of a rule must be questioned when it

can prevent a patient with a legitimate claim from
reaching a jury with his cause because, when he could
not find a "neighborhood" physician to testify in his
behalf, he obtained help from out-of-state.
As with the strict locality rule,· the same gerieral
neighborhood rules ignore
medical practice.

the realities of contemporary

Standards of medical care in Utah are

as high as those in California and the rest of the nation.
Were it otherwise, patients would elect to receive all
but emergency

treatment outside of the state.

treatment of Mrs. Swan was not an emergency.

The
Tr. day 2 at

16. Also Dr. Rocovich was prepared to testify that my

elogratl

· proand decompression laminectomies were not esoteric

.
logists,
cedures, but were performed routinely by neuro

-32-
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orthopedists and neurosurgeons.

Tr. day 3 at 119.

The standard of care for their performance was well
established throughout the country, and was the
same.

Id.
Utah doctors already enjoy a degree of legal

protection not afforded other citizen tortfeasors.

With

the passage of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
they have the protection of a shorter statute of limitations, insulation against liability for breach of
implied contract and warranty, entitlement to the service of an advance notice of intent of any

plaintif~

to commence an action against them for malpractice, plus
special buffers against liability for failure to obtain
a patient's informed consent to treatment.

See Utah

Code Annotated, §§78-14-4, 78-14-6, 78-14-8, 78-14-5,
(Supp. 1976).

When the Washington Supreme Court observed

the preferred status granted to the medical profession
in that state, it refused to affirm the trial court's
application of even the broader "similar community"
rule opting instead for the "general professional" or
national standard, Douglas v. Bussabarger 73 Wash.2d
476, 438 P.2d, 829, 838 (1968).

It said,

If we were to affirm the judgment of the
trial court, not only would we perpetuate the
advantageous position of the medical profession,
but we would exaggerate and extend it unnecessarily.
Douglas, at 831.
Aff irmance of the trial court decision in the present
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case would necessitate adoption by this court of a form
of outmoded and unjust strict locality rule.

The facts

of contemporary medical practice demand the adoption
of a rule more reflective of reality.
POINT IV
THE SIMILAR LOCALITY RULE OFFERS AN ENLIGHTENED
APPROACH TO THE STANDARD OF CARE TO BE APPLIED
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES WHICH, IF APPLIED
IN THIS CASE, WOULD HAVE ALLOWED PLA!NTIFF'S
EXPERT TO TESTIFY ON THE STANDARD OF CARE.
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States
have modified the harsh effects of the strict locality
and same general neighborhood rules by adopting a test
which holds a defendant practitioner to the standard of
skill and care ordinarily observed by other physicians
in good standing in the defendant's same or a similar
locality.

Annot. 37 A.L.R.3d. 420, 426

(1971); King

& Coe, The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 ~
L. Rev. 221, 222

(1974).

At first, some courts elected to interpret "similar
locality" to mean similar in terms of socioeconomic and
geographic factors, e.g. size of population, type of
economy, geographic proximity, etc.
Roberts, 91 N.D. 499, 23-A.2d 361
Komasinski,

See Michael

(1941); Morrill~

256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d, 620 (1950);

v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924

(1902).

however, courts which continue to app 1 Y
-34-

V...:..

~!!!

More recentlY •
the "similar
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locality rule" have tended to reject a purely
socioeconomic or geographic approach and have
instead looked toward the similarity or "medical
factors" such as medical schools, teaching hospitals
and research and laboratory facilities in the localities
to be compared.

See Cook v. Lichtblau,144 So.2d 312

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Sampson v. Veenboer, 252
Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Cavallero v. Sharp,
84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956); Teig v. St. John's
Hospital, 63 Wash.2d 369, 387 P.2d 527

(1963).

See also

40 Fordham L. Rev. 435, 439 (1971); 14 Stan. L. Rev.
884, 890 (1962).
One commentator described as follows the conditions
under which an expert could be qualified to testify in
a malpractice case applying the similar locality rule:
The modern view of a majority of courts
is that a medical expert is free to testify in
a malpractice case if his community or other
communities with which he is familiar bear
sufficient similarity to that of the defendant.
And in determining similarity the courts will
not now look to such socio-economic facts as
population, type of economy, and income level
but to factors more directly relating to the
practice of medicine.
In the main, an expert
practicing in a locality hewing medical
facilities comparable to those existing in the
defendant's community is permitted to testify
concerning the standard of care governing the
defendant.
The number and quality of hospitals,
laboratories and medical schools are typical
considerations.
Of course, the nature of the
community in which the witness currently
practices is irrelev2.nt if he happens also to
possess familiarity with standards in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-35-

defendant's locale or in areas sufficiently
similar to it. Waltz. 18 DePaul L. Rev.
supra at 415.
In Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53

(10th Cir. 1964),

the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Utah law,
affirmed the decision of the trial court to admit the expert testimony of a San Francisco general practitioner
called by plaintiff to establjsh the medical standard of
care for treating bone fractures in Kanab, Utah.

Of interest

in the Riley case is the fact that the foundation laid for
said expert's testimony dealt not with geography or population but with similarities in medical practice.

The evidence

was that plaintiff's expert had operated a 20-bed hospital
in a small Texas town, had set and casted between 120 and
150

fractures similar to the ones in question and, "through

his experience, reading, lectures and travels, was familiar
with the practice in small towns throughout the United
States • . • . " Riley, at 57.

(Emphasis added.)

Further-

more, it was established that the standard of care for
general practitioners was approximately the same in Kanab
as in Salt Lake City and San Francisco.

Since the communities

with which plaintiff's expert was familiar were similar
as to treatment of fractures, he was deemed to have been
properly qualified to testify.
In Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.Zd
440 (1973), the trial court refused to allow a
California pathologist to testify as to whether the
' tiff

defendant North Carolina doctor's treatment of pla;n~~
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was in accord with accepted medical practice on the
grounds that said pathologist was not actually acquainted
with medical practices in the North Carolina community
where defendant ?racticed.

On appeal the trial court

was held to have erred in its ruling.

The court said

that such testimony from the California pathologist should
have been admitted since he was familiar with the standard
of professional competence and care customary in
conununities similar to defendant's among physicians
engaged in his field of practice.
Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159
(1967) also addressed the question of the competency of
out-of-state expert witnesses to testify on the medical
standard of care in a jurisdiction using the similar
locality approach.

In Hundley, plajntiff introduced

deposition testimony frc•m a New York opthalmologist
on the standard of care in a community similar to Charleston, West Virginia.

After noting that the reasons for

the former strict application of the locality rule had
largely disappeared, the court observed that although the
witness did not testify that he was personally familiar
with the standard of care for performance of cataract
operations in Charleston, west Virginia, he nevertheless
did testify that he was fimiliar with the standard of
care observed in such operations throughout the entire
country. The court said that such testimony was sufficient
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to show his familiarity with the standard of care in Charle;.
ton,because if the witness was familiar with the

sta~a~

procedure for performing cataract operations throughout the
entire country, his familiarity with such standard procedur'
therefore embraced Charleston, West Virginia.

The court

stated that it was rejecting a strict application of the
locality rule and was holding instead that since the witness
was sufficiently

familiar with the standard of medical

practice in areas similar to Charleston, he was therefore
sufficiently familiar with the standard of Charleston to be
competent to testify in the case.
Should the court conclude that the proper rule to
apply in Utah with respect. to the medical standard of care,
is the similar locality rule, logic, reason and reality
dictate that the correct measure of an area's similarity
is not geographic proximity or demographic composition, but
the similarity of medical factors such as the presence of or
access to medical schools, hospitals, laboratories, research
facilities, equipment, speciality assistance, libraries,
reference materials and publications.
Under such a test Dr. Rocovich was properly qualified
. d

tc- give testimony on the standard of care to be app 1 ie ·

pJa1:

Salt Lake CitY
tiff offered to prove that the Los Angeles and
The court,
medical communities were similar. Tr. day 4 at 15.
Testimony that was ir::
however, rejected the offer. Id. at 16.
duced either directly or by way of proffer es tablished Lhal
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l

like Los Ange] es, Salt Lake City, through facilities at
the university of Utah, was a regional medical center
serving a large geographic segment of the western United
states.

Tr. day 4 at 15. The Orthopedic Hospital of

Los Angeles with which plaintiff's expert is associated,
is affiliated with an accredited medical school and provides
a complete training program for interns, while both it and
the Queen of Angeles Hospital provide a complete training
program for residents.

Tr. day 3 at 104; American Hospital

Association, The AHA Guide to the Health Care Field 32
(1972).

Hospitals in Salt Lake City have similar affiliations

with and access to the expertise at the University of Utah
Medical School, and offer training programs for interns
and residents.

Tr. day 3 at 107.

AHA Guide, supra at 223.

The programs in which residency training is conducted in LOS
Angeles as well as Salt Lake City are supervised by national
accreditation agencies which require compliance with the
same standards of training and practice in the separate
localities.

Tr. day 4 at 13; 14 Stan. L. Rev. 884, 888,

n.20 (1962).

Plaintiff's expert testified that the Univer-

sity of Utah Medical School was "a very good one."
3 at 107.

Tr. day

He said that because of the quality of the school,

the physicians of Salt Lake City were able "to offer good
medical care to the people of this community like all good
medical schools should . . . and do."

Tr. day 3 at 107.

Both the Queen of Angeles Hospital and the Orthopedic
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Hospital of Los Angeles are and have been accredited
from some time.

Tr. 3 at 108.

Accreditation is

grant~

by a national organization which requires compliance
with certain standards set for the medical staff; and
the nursing, anesthesia, dietetic, emergency, environmental,
medical records, nuclear medicine, pathology, pharmaceutical
and library services, to name a few.

See Joint Commission

on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals (1970).
Each year the American Hospital Association publishes
a list of U.S. Hospitals in which it itemizes the nature
of facilities contained tberein and approvals granted
thereto.

In 1972, the list showed important medical similar·

ities between the Queen of Angels and the Orthopedic Hospitali
of Los Angeles, where Dr. Rocovich practices, and the St.
Mark's Hospital of Salt Lake where Dr. Thoen and Dr· Lamb
practice.

Common to the said Los Angeles Hospitals and

the St. Mark's Hospital were the following facilities:
postoperative recovery room, intensive care unit, pharmacy
. with FT registered pharmacist, histophathology laboratory,
blood bank, electroencephalagraphy capabilities, inhalation
therapy departments, physical therapy departments, emergency
d · units,
departments, social work departments, intensive car iac
rt·
psychiatric emergency services, organized outpatient depa
tments.
· l auxi· 1 iaries
·
·
ments, h ospita
and vol_u_ nteer services depar
·
·
The AHA Gui· de to the
He~
American Hospital Association,
~-

-40-
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care Field 32, 223 (1972).

When other Salt Lake and Los

Angeles hospitals are compared,

it can be seen that as of

1972 both localities contained very complete hospital
facilities according to the American Hospital Association. Id.
There is ready access to medical literature in both
Salt Lake City and Los Angeles.

The University of Utah

Medical School has a very complete library, and each
accredited hospital is to provide books, periodicals and
other materials appropriate to meet the needs of the medical
and hospital staff.

Joint Commission of Accreditation of

Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (1970)~

Dr.

Rocovich testified that he had ready access to the libraries
of the Los Angeles County Medical Association, Queen of
Angels Hospital, Orthopedic Hospital of Los Angeles, and the
medical schools at the University of Southern California and
the University of California at Los Angeles.

Tr. day 3 at

108-109.

In addition to stating his professional and educational
credentials, Dr. Rocovich testified that he had personally
performed in excess of 1,000 myelograrns and 1,000 lumbar
decompression laminectomies of the type performed by
defendants upon Mrs. Swan.

(Tr. day 3 at 109).

Had the court

applied the similar locality rule to the medical standard of
care, it would have allowed Dr. Rocovich to express an
opinion thereon and could not have granted defendants' motion
to d ismiss
· ·
on the grounds that it did.
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POINT V
IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE REALITIES OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE TODAY TO REQUIRE COMPLIANCE
BY THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, ESPECIALLY ITS
SPECIALISTS, WITH A NATIONAL STANDARD OF CARE.
Physicians practicing as specialists in the treatment
of some particular condition have consistently been held to
a higher standard of care than their generalist collegues,
Rather than be held only to the standards of practice in
localities similar to his, the specialist is required to
exercise that degree of skill and care ordinarily possessed
and used by similar specialists.

Annot. 21 A.L.R.3d 953

(1968).

Restatement (Second) of Torts

§299A, Comment d

(1965).

In an article prepared for the American Medical

Association Office of General Counsel the following comment
concerning the standard of care required of specialists
appeared:
The specialist is increasingly presumed to
have kept up with his field, and courts point
out in numerous decisions that the reason a
patient consults a specialist is in order to
see a physician who has kept up with advances
in medicine. Therefore, an increasing number
of courts find it appropriate to hold specialists
to a national standard of due care. Holder,
Standard of Care for Specialists, 226 J.A.M.A~
395, 396 (1973).
In Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 1

56

(1972) the plaintiff, in a malpractice action against an
Arizona specialist, called a Los Angeles neurosurgeon as
her expert witness.

At trial the court ruled plaintiff's

ard of care was
expert incompetent to State What the Stand
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l

in the community where the defendant practiced, on the
grounds that he had no personal experience in the state.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed.
We hold that, for a plaintiff to recover
in a malpractice case involving a specialist,
he must prove that the defendant specialist in
his acts failed tc• meet the standard of care
required of physicians in the same speciality
practiced by the defendant. Krenke at 159.
The court further held that for an expert to qualify
to express an opinion on what that standard of care is he
must be shown to have knowledge of and familiarity "with
the standard of care and treatment commonly practiced by
physicians engaged in the same type of speciality as the
defendant."

Id.

A similar result was reached in Nacarrato v. Grob,
384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970).

There the trial

court was reversed for not allowing two specialists, one
from Los Angeles and another from Chicago, to testify for
the plaintiff in a malpractice case against a Detroit
specialist.

The Michigan Supreme Court said,

The reliance of the public upon the skills
of a specialist and the wealth and sources of
his knowledge are not limited to the geographic
~rea in which he practices.
Rather his knowledge
is a specialty. He specializes so that he may
keep abreast. Any other standard for a specialist
would negate the fundamental expectations and
purpose of a specialty.
The standard of care for
~ specialist should be that of a resaonable special~
is~ practicing medicine in light of present.day
scientific knowledge.
Therefore, geographical
conditions or circumstances control neither the
standard of a specialist's care nor the competence
of an expert's testimony.
Nacarrato, at 791.
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The incorporation into the law of a national

su~~

of care for specialists is simply a recognition of that
which the doctors themselves did long ago.

The establish·

ment and maintenance of national standards for specialists
has long been a purpose and function of the American Board
of Medical Specialities.

Marquis--Who' s Who, 1

of Medical Specialists xvii (15th ed. 1972).

Directo~

The Board,

by means of comprehensive written and oral examinations
administered on a nationwide basis to qualifying candidates,
determines and certifies the competence of its members.
at xviii; Tr. day 2 at 2; 3 at 65-66.

!i·

Such a program results,

in the establishment of a uniform standard of care throughou:
the United States in each specialty field.
Both defendant physicians testified that the standard \
of care in their particular special ties was uniform througho·,:
the country.

During examination of defendant Dr. Lamb, the

following exchange occurred:
Q.
Doctor, I unc1erstand you are . . · a
certified board member of orthopedics?
A. American Board of Orthopedic Surgery, yes.
Q.
And that board is governed by a national
standard, is it not?
A.
Yes.
.
ld
Q.
And orthopedists from Salt Lake City wou ,
take the same test that orthopedists from ca1ifo~nia
would take, would be held at the same standards; is
that correct?
_
A.
Yes, it is a national test.
.
have
Q.
And the principles of orthopedic surgery
become pre.tty well nationalized, haven't they?
A.
Yes.

Tr. day 2 at 2.

-44-
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-Defendant Dr. Thoen said much the same thing:

Q. Doctor, is the standard of skill and care
for neurologists
. uniform within the United
States?
A.
The standard of care for board certified
neurologists is supposed to be uniform throughout
the states, yes.
Tr. day 3 at 5.

See also Tr. day 3 at 67.

Dr. Thoen went on to agree that the standard of care required
of non-board certified neurologists was the same as for
certified neurologists.

Tr. day 3 at 6.

When one examines the educational backgrounds of the
Utah specialists certified

~-n

the specialty fields of

o~tho-

pedic surgery and neurology as of 1972, it can be readily
appreciated that geography is not determinative of standards
of care.

Utah orthopedic specialists, fer example, studied

in Utah, California, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Minnesota,
Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Tennesse, New Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin,
Massachusetts, Oregon, Kansas, Indiana, New Jersey and Ohio.
Marquis--Who' s Who, l Directory of Medical Specialists 1059
(15th ed. 1972).

Utah neurology specialists studied in Utah,

Colorado, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
New York, Alaska, California, Maryland and Massachusetts.
Id. v. 2, at 1820-21.

The defendants in this case have

studied in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Iowa and Massachusetts in
addition to Utah. Tr. day 2 at 1, 76; 3 at 1, 2, 75.
The defendants in this case are both certified specialists who, by their own admissions, are governed by a national
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standard of care.

As was stated by one court, "A defendant

should not be judged by a lower standard than he himself
requests."

Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash.2d 476, 433

P.2d 829, 837

(1968).

It was error for the trial court to

have applied the rule that it did in the face of defendants'
admissions.
In 1934, the Utah Supreme Court was presented with the
question of whether a general medical professional standard h

11

of care should be applied in judging the conduct of a
physician charged with malpractice.
Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348

(1934).

Coon v. Shields, 88

The issue arose when, following

i

treatment of plaintiff's fractured leg, gangrene set in
necessitating its amputation.

Among plaintiff's allegations ,

of negligence against her doctor was the claim that he failed\
to clean and disinfect her leg wound.

At trial, one of the

questions propounded to plaintiff's expert was ".

what

methods according to the present standard of care and skill
and state of medical science might be 'done' in the way of
cleaning the wound."

Coon, at 82, 39 P.2d at 350.

The

trial court ruled out the answer to this and other questions
asked of the expert and, at the close of the evidence, directed a verdict for the defendant.

Plaintiff appealed.

In addressing the propriety of the trial court's
urt upheld
ruling w:Lth respect to the above question, the Co
·
·
·
1 standard as set by the medical
o f a nationa
t h e re)ection
profession.

However, in so holding, the court joined

unanimously in predicting the eventual adoption of such a
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standard in Utah:
When we consider the modern advanced stage
of the med~cal profession, the many facilities
for communication and dissemination of the latest
developments in the various sciences involved in
the practice of that profession, we can say that
there is some justice in contending that the
standard of care required of a physician or
Siirgeoilshould not be limited to any particular
community or locality in an effort to recognize
a natural migration of the more skilled to the
larger centers of population.
The time will
undoubtedly come when such limitation will fall
by the wayside.
Is that time here now? We
believe not, and cite as our reason for so
believing the fact that in these Western States
there are still many communities cut off from the
advantages of easy communication with the outside
world. Coon, at 82-83, 39 P.2d at 350.
Developments since 1934 clearly demonstrate that-as
predicted by the Court, the time has come for the geographical
limitations of medical standards to "fall by the wayside."
Advances in the fields of transportation and communication
alone virtually assure today's physician ready access to
current information, modern hospital facilities, and skilled
specialists in all but the most serious emergency situations.
Seventeen years ago Louisell and Williams wrote of the
many aids then readily available to physicians to help them
keep abreast of developments in their profession.

Among

the aids listed were:
The "comprehensive coverage" of the Journal
of the American Medic~l Association, the
availability of numerous other journals, the
ubiquitous "detail men" of the drug companies,
clo~ed circuit television presentations of medical
subJects, special radio networks for physicians,
tape recorded digests of med~cal literature, and
hundreds of widely available post graduate courses.
D. Louisell & H. Williams, The Parenchyma of Law 183
(1960).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-47-

The authors observed that the medical profession was,
through such means, establishing national standards.

They

then added, "Medicine realizes this, so it is inevitable
that the law will do likewise."

Id. at 184.

In addition to the items mentioned above, many
other factors contribute to the establishment of nationally
uniform standards for doctors.

As a condition of licensure

in most states, a doctor must have graduated from an
accredited medical school which, in order to qualify for
such accreditation, must meet rigid standards imposed by
national organizations of the American Medical Association.
See Medi.cal Education in the United States, 210 J.A.M.A.
1455, 1460 (1969).

Internship and residency

programs~

I

hospitals likewise require special approval by national
organizations, which approval is contingent upon the hospital''
being accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of
Hospitals, an arm of the American Hospital Association. See
14 Stan. L. Rev. 884, 888, n.20

(1962).

The role of the

specialty boards in setting uniform standards of care has
already been mentioned.

See supra, at 44.

The federal government is also beginning to play a
significant role in the establishment of uniform national
America's
Near 1 y h a 1 f o f the money for
t
Lee,
medical schools now comes from the federal governmen ·
standards o f care.

1

alth A~~
Medical Education--A Brief History, Medical and He ~
29

(Encyc, Brit. 1977).

With the recently enacted federal
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statute creating Professional Standards Review Organizations, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is
empowered, under certain circumstances, to establish uniform
standards of care.

42 U.S.C.A. §1320c-l et. seq.

(1974).

The standards required of health care providers qualified
to administer trea trnent under the Medicare and Medicaid
programs are also detailed, exacting and nationally consistent.

42 U. S .C .A. §1395 et. seq.

(1974), and applicable

regulations.
As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts when it struck down the locality rule in its jurisdiction, "The time has come when the medical profession
should no longer be Balkanized by the application of varying
geographic standards in malpr.o.ctice cases."

Bruce v.

Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in excluding testimony from Dr.
Peter Rocovich on the medical standard of care for defendants'
performance of a myelogram and a lumbar decompression
laminectomy upon Mrs. Jeannette Swan.

In excluding said

testimony the court applied a version of the anachronistic
strict locality rule which-is not and should not be the law
in Utah.
The non-geographically based similar locality rule
and the national standard of the profession rule are those
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which most accurately reflect conditions in contemporary
medical practice.

The latter rule is especially appropriate

in this case because both defendants held themselves out
as specialists in their profession.
Plaintiff's expert was properly qualified to
testify on the applicable standards of medical care
under either the similar locality or national standard
rules.

For this reason plaintiff should have been

permitted to reach the jury with her claims of defendants'
negligence.

The judgment of the lower court must be

reversed and a new trial ordered.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

.id.._day

of May, 1977.

HANSEN & ORTON

HANSEN
Attorney or Plaintiff/Appellant
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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